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Professor Robert A. Stein, Dean of the University of Minne-
sota Law School for fifteen years and former Chief Operating 
Officer of the American Bar Association, endowed this lecture 
series to enrich the program of the University of Minnesota Law 
School by inviting leaders of the bench and bar and of the gov-
ernments of the United States and other nations to deliver an 
annual lecture on a topic of national or international interest. 
Former Vice President of the United States Walter F. Mondale 
was invited to speak at the Inaugural Stein Lecture and en-
gaged in a conversation with Professor Stein regarding the jux-
taposition of national security and the Constitution.  
*  *  * 
National security and justice is a strange and challenging 
subject—much of what we need to know about it is classified 
and operates behind a dark curtain of obfuscation and secrecy. 
I had the unique opportunity to be involved behind the curtain 
as a member of the United States Senate Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, also known as the “Church Committee” named for its 
chairman, Senator Frank Church. I headed the investigation of 
the domestic operations of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, IRS, U.S. 
Postal Service, and the White House. The Church Committee 
conducted the most thorough intelligence investigation in his-
tory. Later, I observed the intelligence community from a dif-
ferent perspective and was able to closely watch these same 
agencies from inside the White House. I served on the National 
Security Council; I was informed and often involved in many 
significant secret efforts over those years; and I was also one of 
the few in the government who read the ultimate secret docu-
ment—The President’s Daily Brief—every day for those four 
years. 
The United States needs a strong, and mostly secret, intel-
ligence service. The United States faces many dangerous 
threats and it must fully prepare for and meet them: however, 
this must be done in a way that protects our constitutional lib-
erties. The idea that security requires the sacrifice of our con-
stitutional rights is a false choice. In fact, it is the other way 
around. A free and open nation will face its true problems more 
effectively, earn the public’s trust more completely, and avoid 
the recurrent abuse of power that predictably arises from unac-
countable government. 
This is not a new concept. Our founders demonstrated 
their fear of tyranny by the adoption of the Bill of Rights; I’ve 
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often marveled at how compelling and specific our founders 
could be. 
  The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.1
History teaches us that our founders, in proposing the 
Fourth Amendment, sought to prohibit the use of the notorious 
“general warrants” used by the crown in the colonies.
 
2 General 
warrants permitted its possessors to ransack and harass people 
without restraint.3 Great Britain had long since prohibited the 
hated general warrant,4
The great challenge in the conduct of our classified intelli-
gence operations is that it is very difficult, and sometimes al-
most impossible, to ensure the accountability envisioned in our 
Constitution. Exotic technology has also had an incredible im-
pact upon intelligence operations and should not be underesti-
mated.
 but it was still in use in the colonies. 
Our founders were also constructing a government of checks 
and balances that would protect us against the concentration of 
power in one branch or person and against what they thought 
could be the resulting tyranny.  
5 When the United States experiences something horri-
ble, like 9/11 or the Vietnam War, the law is often overlooked in 
the desperate pursuit of safety.6
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 In the Civil War, President 
 2. Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 61–62 (2013) 
(statement of Laura K. Donohue, Professor, Georgetown Law), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-2-13DonohueTestimony.pdf 
(describing general warrants as “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, 
turning colonists against the crown”).  
 3. See id. at 62 (“Acting under [general] writs established by Parliamen-
tary statute, officers of the crown had permission to search homes, papers, and 
belongs of any person.” (emphasis added)). 
 4. See id. (discussing Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 
(C.B.), an English case from 1765 that finally, and “flatly,” ended the use of 
general warrants). 
 5. See, e.g., Alexander W. Joel, Choosing Both: Making Technology 
Choices at the Intersections of Privacy and Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1751 
(2010) (“Technology plays a critical role in intelligence activities, enabling in-
telligence agencies to pursue their national-security mission more effectively 
and efficiently.”). 
 6. See id. at 1756 (envisioning this occurrence as a government official 
using a scale to “metaphorically weigh[] the benefits for national security that 
a new technology has to offer against the costs to privacy or civil liberties that 
using the technology might entail”). 
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Lincoln waived habeas corpus protections;7 in World War I, the 
infamous Palmer Raids were conducted wholesale against polit-
ical suspects;8 in Minnesota, we adopted the shameful Minne-
sota Public Safety Commission, which sought to remove Minne-
sotans of German ancestry from office and censor the news.9 In 
World War II, horrified by Pearl Harbor, we placed thousands 
of Americans of Japanese ancestry, suspected of no criminal 
conduct, in so-called “relocation camps.”10
After 9/11, our government ignored the law requiring war-
rants for the investigation of alleged spying in America and es-
tablished jails in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere 
where suspects could be held incommunicado, without counsel, 
in a miasma of lawlessness.
 
11 Many were tortured with little 
right to counsel or trial by virtue of legal opinions issued in se-
cret while skirting normal channels. As one high official said, 
we went to the “dark side.”12 When Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor wrote an opinion striking down some of 
these excesses, she famously wrote: “We have long since made 
clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President 
when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”13
 
 7. Jonathan Hafetz, A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus During 
the Lincoln and Bush Presidencies, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 439, 444 (2009). 
 In all of 
 8. See CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER RAIDS TO THE PATRI-
OT ACT: A HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 3 (2007) (not-
ing that over three thousand members of the Communist Party and the Com-
munist Labor Party were seized in January of 1919 alone). 
 9. Dan Olson, In Another Time of War, Minnesota Suspended Civil Liber-
ties, MINN. PUB. RADIO (July 4, 2005), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/ 
features/2005/07/04_olsond_safety/ (describing the commission as “presid[ing] 
over a reign of terror”). 
 10. See generally Orville Schell, Rounding up Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
1, 1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/01/books/rounding-up-americans 
.html (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE 
INTERNMENT CASES (1983), and describing Irons’ relentless pursuit of infor-
mation pertaining to Japanese relocation during World War II).  
 11. Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, with Apologies, 86 TEX. L. REV. 569, 597 
(2008) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BAL-
ANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007) and RICHARD A. POSNER, 
NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 
(2002)) (recounting the Bush administration’s stance toward Guantanamo 
Bay, and its attempt to argue that the “Executive has unchecked unilateral 
authority to detain individuals, including U.S. citizens, he deems ‘enemy com-
batants’ in the war on terror”).  
 12. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY ON HOW THE WAR 
ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 9–10 (2008) (referring 
to former Vice President Dick Cheney, who candidly stated “[w]e’ve got to 
spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world”). 
 13. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). 
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these cases, fear overcame clear thinking and certainly under-
mined the belief in our own laws. And in every case, when the 
peril of the situation finally subsided, we have unveiled and re-
alized the shameful things we have done to our wonderful 
country and its citizens. 
It is not only these profound abuses that need concern us. 
As we found in our Church Committee Report, improper intel-
ligence activities can chill and undermine the vitality of our 
democracy by discrediting citizens, manipulating the media, 
distorting data to influence public policy and perception, 
chilling First Amendment rights, and imperiling the free ex-
change of ideas.14
I.  THE CHURCH COMMITTEE   
 
The Church Committee was established after The New 
York Times published an article written by Seymour Hersh de-
tailing “a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation dur-
ing the Nixon Administration.”15 Hersh reported on a host of “il-
legal activities by members of the C.I.A. inside the United 
States, beginning in the nineteen-fifties, including break-ins, 
wiretapping and the surreptitious inspection of mail.”16
In our final report
 The 
Church Committee marked the first time, and maybe the last 
time, in history that intelligence agencies would be so thor-
oughly investigated. The Domestic Task Force, which I chaired, 
was charged with investigating the intelligence abuses against 
Americans by our own agencies, i.e., FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, IRS, 
and the White House. By early 1976, the Church Committee 
had interviewed eight hundred witnesses and reviewed over 
110,000 pages of classified documents.  
17
 
 14. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. 
NO. 94-755, at 15–17 (2d Sess. 1976), available at 
 on domestic abuses, we found that eve-
ry President from Roosevelt to Nixon had pressed secret agen-
https://archive.org/stream/ 
finalreportofsel02unit#page/14/mode/2up.  
 15. Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against 
Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at 
1. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY 
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 
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cies to go beyond the law; the CIA, with the Post Office’s coop-
eration, illegally opened mail for over twenty years, collecting 
information on 1.5 million Americans;18 the CIA conducted ex-
periments with LSD on unwitting subjects;19 the NSA inter-
cepted every overseas telegram sent or received by an Ameri-
can citizen between 1947 and 1975;20 the FBI kept files on one 
million Americans and a half million so-called “subversives” all 
without a single court conviction; as a form of political harass-
ment, the FBI conducted audits of the tax returns of 11,000 
groups and individuals; the FBI conducted hundreds of burgla-
ries, coined “black bag jobs,” of political groups;21 the FBI des-
ignated 26,000 individuals to be incarcerated in the event of a 
“national emergency” (the list included Dr. Martin Luther King 
and Norman Mailer); and President Nixon approved a so-called 
“Huston Plan” to monitor Vietnam War protesters, who were 
assumed to be under the direction of foreign powers.22
During our hearings, we often heard the complaint that 
innocent people need not worry about unauthorized investiga-
tions. So, what about the FBI’s secret war against Dr. Martin 
Luther King? He was a gentle apostle of non-violence. Yet Di-
rector Hoover and the Bureau thought Dr. King to be the “most 
dangerous Negro leader” and a communist.
 We also 
found that Army intelligence investigated 100,000 citizens dur-
ing the Vietnam War. 
23 They sought to 
damage his marriage, block the conferral of a Nobel Peace 
Prize, prevent a Papal visit, and, at one point, a Bureau in-
spired letter appeared to suggest that he commit suicide.24 Peo-
ple at the top of the FBI wanted to delegitimize Dr. King and 
replace him with a leader of their choice.25
These abuses were bi-partisan. These Presidents saw the 
intelligence agencies as extensions of their private power, as 
 
 
 18. Id. at 282. 
 19. Id. at 286. 
 20. Id. at 57–60. 
 21. Id. at 176. 
 22. Id. at 428–29. 
 23. 143 CONG. REC. 2210–12 (1997). 
 24. Danielle Cadet, How the FBI Invaded Martin Luther King Jr.’s Priva-
cy—And Tried to Blackmail Him into Suicide, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 
2014, 8:36 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/20/martin-luther 
-king-fbi_n_4631112.html (discussing the FBI’s anonymous note “chastising 
[King] for his affairs and implying that he should commit suicide”). 
 25. 143 CONG. REC. 2210 (1997) (stating that the FBI ultimately wanted 
to “replace King with a manageable black leader”). 
  
2014]  NATIONAL SECURITY  2017 
 
indeed they were. What those Presidents and Director Hoover 
also shared was a belief that they had to break the law in order 
to protect our nation; that is, the law weakened us. There was 
also a widespread belief among many leaders that the Presi-
dent held vast implied national security power to circumvent 
the law to protect us. The campaign against Dr. King and the 
other intelligence excesses, I believe, showed that we had cre-
ated a secret government accountable only to itself. 
The Church Committee proposed deep reforms of the intel-
ligence community.26 The Committee found there was no inher-
ent authority in the name of “national security” authorizing a 
President or any agency to violate the law.27 The Committee 
called for permanent Senate and House committees on intelli-
gence that would have authority over the entire intelligence 
community, the power of oversight over the agencies and their 
budgets, and the responsibility to clear nominees for top CIA, 
NSA, and other security positions. Beginning with the 1974 
Hughes-Ryan Act, Presidents are now required to personally 
approve all important covert actions and report them to the in-
telligence committees “in a timely fashion.”28 Attorney General 
Levi issued new regulations to keep the FBI out of political 
matters.29
In 1978, we authorized a unique U.S. Federal Court under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to oversee requests 
for surveillance warrants against suspected foreign intelligence 




 26. See generally S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976). 
 The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) operates ex parte and in camera to-
 27. Cf. id. at 425 (“The Committee finds that intelligence activities should 
not be regarded as ends in themselves.”). 
 28. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, sec. 32, § 662(a), 
88 Stat. 1795, 1804 (“No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any 
other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency 
. . . unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important 
to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a 
description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the 
Congress . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 29. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES 36 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/ 
special/0509/final.pdf (reiterating Attorney General Levi’s contempt for “Gov-
ernment monitoring of individuals or groups because they hold unpopular or 
controversial political views,” calling it “intolerable”). 
 30. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
511, § 103, 92. Stat. 1783, 1788 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803 
(2006)). 
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gether with a separate FISA appellate court. The reforms rec-
ommended by the Church Committee sought to grapple with 
the tension between security and our liberty.31
II.  REFORMS   
 We had no past 
experiences to look to for guidance and the reforms were un-
precedented. They worked, I think, for several years but, with 
time, several weaknesses became apparent. A new set of re-
forms must be implemented to once again insure that the Con-
stitution is protected. 
Reforms are needed to modernize our law to reflect current 
challenges. These reforms should focus both on the FISC and 
the various intelligence agencies and committees. At times, the 
FISC was abused by government agencies and the Court ig-
nored or failed to report the abuses.32 The FISC, at times, 
seems to act as a buffer against Congress and the regular 
courts, giving the intelligence agencies a closed-circuit kind of 
private justice and “supreme court.”33 I suggest the FISC be re-
stricted to warrant issuance only and be required to publicly 
report most of its decisions interpreting the law. Congress did 
not envision a law-making role for the FISC.34 Its decisions 
were not to serve as precedent, nor was the FISC to offer 
lengthy legal analyses, crafting in the process, for instance, ex-
ceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement or de-
fenses of wholesale surveillance programs. A recently disclosed 
decision by the FISC held that “because the Application at is-
sue here concerns only the production of call detail records or 
‘telephony metadata’ belonging to a telephone company, and 
not the contents of communications . . . there is no Fourth 
Amendment impediment to the collection.”35 We never intended 
the Court to make this type of broad ruling.36
 
 31. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 7–9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3904, 3908–10. 
 Because this type 
of determination is often necessary, these cases should be 
brought before a federal district court of general jurisdiction to 
issue an opinion and establish the rule of law.  
 32. Accord Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of 
N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in 
-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powers-of-nsa.html. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See generally S. REP. NO. 95-604. 
 35. In re FBI, No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 
2013) (declassified U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court decision).  
 36. See generally S. REP. NO. 95-604. 
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An independent legal office should be established to repre-
sent the nation’s interests in the protection of privacy and civil 
liberties before the FISC, including appeals. The manner of ap-
pointment of judges to the Court, lack of technical expertise, 
and absence of an effective adversarial process has harmed the 
Court’s ability to function. Broad issues should be left to a court 
of general jurisdiction.  
Another barrier to analyzing the constitutionality of gov-
ernment actions is the state secrets privilege. The state secrets 
privilege is an evidentiary privilege that the government can 
utilize to exclude evidence that might disclose sensitive infor-
mation that would threaten national security.37 Often the judge 
does not even conduct an in camera review of the information 
and therefore the privilege may be easily abused. As an eviden-
tiary privilege, the state secrets privilege excludes evidence, 
but alarmingly, some courts have used the privilege to dismiss 
the entire case as claimed.38
Clearly, the United States must keep some secrets. By law, 
a person may not disclose the identity of an undercover secret 
agent; knowing and willful disclosure of certain classified in-
formation is prohibited; secrecy orders have been issued on cer-
tain areas of research such as atomic energy and cryptography; 
and all data concerning the design, manufacture, or utilization 
of atomic weapons and the production of special nuclear mate-
rial is classified.
 Excluding the evidence may hinder 
the plaintiff’s case so severely that it is voluntarily dismissed. 
This creates a justiciability issue rather than just an eviden-
tiary issue. Besides requiring the judge or a third-party neutral 
to review the evidence before it is excluded, I suggest a formal 




 37. See generally Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 77 (2010). 
 Also, some of the reform could be administra-
 38. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
2009); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Trulock v. Lee, 
66 F. App’x 472 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 39. 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2012) (prohibiting the disclosure of undercover secret 
agent identities); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. ET AL., REPORT OF THE JOINT POLICY 
GROUP FOR THE PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN AND USE CON-
TROL INFORMATION (2000), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/ 
doe/joint_report.html (detailing the prohibited use of classified nuclear infor-
mation). 
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tive, but I hope we do not move towards a “states secrets act” 
found in many nations.40
Now, let me point out the alarming size of the United 
States intelligence community. According to an article in The 
Washington Post,
  
41 1271 government organizations and 1931 
private companies work on programs related to counterterror-
ism, homeland security, and intelligence in about 10,000 loca-
tions across the United States; in Washington D.C. and the 
surrounding area, thirty-three building complexes for top-
secret intelligence work are under construction or have been 
built since September 2001. Departmental intelligence agencies 
include: the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Department of 
Defense; intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and Marines; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the 
Department of State; the Office of Terrorism and Finance Intel-
ligence of the Department of Treasury; the Office of Intelligence 
and the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions of 
the FBI; the Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy; 
and the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection and Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence of the 
Department of Homeland Security. Unfortunately, as a result 
of the severely fragmented intelligence community, many secu-
rity and intelligence agencies do the same work, creating re-
dundancy and waste. For example, fifty-one federal organiza-
tions and military commands, operating in fifteen United 
States cities, track the flow of money to and from terrorist net-
works.42
Additionally, an estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times 





 40. See, e.g., Lucy Craft, Japan’s State Secrets Law: Hailed by U.S., De-
nounced by Japanese, NPR (Dec. 31, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
parallels/2013/12/31/258655342/japans-state-secrets-law-hailed-by-u-s 
-denounced-by-japanese. 
 I believe we should take a very close look at 
the size and disarray existing among our many agencies and 
the growing privatization of security and intelligence services. 
Secret clearances should be determined at the highest level of 
our government and should be limited to the subject matter 
that the employee needs to complete his job function. Too many 
 41. Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond 
Control, WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top 
-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/print/.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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people are given top secret status in a very sloppy system (e.g., 
Edward Snowden).44
Recent news has been flooded with leaks of secret intelli-
gence programs. In 2013, a top secret order issued by the FISC 
was leaked to the media by Edward Snowden.
 We must also look at the runaway size and 
the sheer ballooning cost of our secret activities. Classification 
systems are much abused in our government. Everything is 
classified; some, but not all of it, top secret. We need a different 
standard.  
45 It required a 
subsidiary of Verizon to provide a daily, ongoing feed of all call 
detail records—including those for domestic calls—to the NSA 
(telephone metadata program).46 I believe much of the metada-
ta collection directed against innocent Americans should be 
prohibited. Currently, at least one federal court has also agreed 
that the bulk collection of telephone metadata violates the Con-
stitution.47 The recent clashes with our friends overseas who 
have apparently been wiretapped by the NSA—like Chancellor 
Merkel in Germany, President Hollande in France, and oth-
ers—tell us that our technology prowess far exceeds the quality 
of our judgment.48
On December 12, 2013, the President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies made a series of 
remarkable recommendations for the NSA.
 Certainly, the public debate about what hap-
pened, and who knew what and when, makes us look ridicu-
lous.  
49
• End the domestic program storing bulk telephone 
metadata by placing such materials in separate 
 These recommen-
dations, which I suggest merit serious consideration, include: 
 
 44. See Eric Schmitt, C.I.A. Warning on Snowden in ’09 Said to Slip 
Through the Cracks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
10/11/us/cia-warning-on-snowden-in-09-said-to-slip-through-the-cracks.html. 
 45. Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He 
Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillance-data.html. 
 46. Edward Snowden: Leaks that Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC 
NEWS (Jan. 17, 2014, 9:56 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada 
-23123964. 
 47. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 48. See Alison Smale, Anger Growing Among Allies on U.S. Spying, N. Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/world/europe/united 
-states-disputes-reports-of-wiretapping-in-Europe.html. 
 49. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., 
LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013), available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf. 
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storage and allowing the NSA access only through a 
court order;  
• Public officials should not have access to otherwise 
private information (such as bank records, credit 
card records, telephone records, and Internet data) 
from third parties (such as banks, credit card com-
panies, telephone companies, and Internet provid-
ers) without a court order;  
• Congress should enact legislation to authorize tele-
phone, Internet, and other providers to disclose to 
the public general information about orders they 
receive directing them to provide information to the 
government, and the government should disclose, 
on a regular basis, similar general information 
about the orders it has issued in programs whose 
existence is unclassified;  
• The President should create a new process requir-
ing high-level policy approval of all sensitive intel-
ligence requirements and the methods that the in-
telligence community may use;  
• Congress should create the position of public inter-
est advocate to represent the nation’s interests in 
the protection of privacy and civil liberties before 
the FISC, including appeals, and make decisions of 
the court declassified whenever possible;  
• Congress should create a strengthened and inde-
pendent Civil Liberties and Privacy Protection 
Board;  
• Regarding the classification system, departments 
and agencies should institute a “work-related ac-
cess” approach to the dissemination of sensitive, 
classified information and should adopt network se-
curity practices that are at the cutting edge of tech-
nology. 
On January 17, 2014, President Obama announced that 
the government would stop storing massive amounts of tele-
phone metadata on NSA computers and asked the Attorney 
General and intelligence agencies to work with Congress to de-
termine an alternative location for the metadata.50
 
 50. Carol E. Lee & Siobhan Gorman, Obama Says NSA’s Mass Collection 
of U.S. Phone Data Will End, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424052702304603704579326333792513314. 
 He has also 
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directed the Attorney General to work with the FISC so that 
during the transition period, the database can be queried only 
after a judicial finding, or in an emergency.51 Additionally, “[t]o 
ensure that the [FISC] hears a broader range of privacy per-
spectives, the President called on Congress to authorize the es-
tablishment of a panel of advocates from outside the govern-
ment to provide an independent voice in significant cases before 
the [FISC].”52 The President also ended the monitoring of com-
munications of heads of state of close American allies and im-
plemented various other reforms.53 These reforms are a step in 
the right direction, but many concerns remain unaddressed.54
The week following the President’s announcement, the Pri-
vacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an independent bi-
partisan agency within the executive branch, concluded that 
the government has no statutory authority for the domestic 
program storing bulk telephone metadata.
  
55 The Board found 
the program infringed on First56 and Fourth Amendment57 
rights, and had “not proven useful in identifying unknown ter-
rorists or terrorist plots.”58 It also made recommendations to 
improve the FISC.59
Thirty years ago, I might have expected that the reforms 
implemented by the Church Committee and the changes dis-
cussed above would fix most intelligence problems for the long 
term, but now, I doubt it. In addition to reforms, we need to 
keep a closer watch on the activities of our intelligence agen-
cies. Checks and balances restraints, when made in secret, do 
 Two prestigious presidentially appointed 
committees have now arrived at essentially the same conclu-
sion. 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Review of U.S. Signals Intel-
ligence, (Jan. 17, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press  
-office/2014/01/17/fact-sheet-review-us-signals-intelligence.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Devlin Barrett, Obama’s Plan Leaves Unanswered Questions, WALL 
ST. J. WASH. WIRE (Jan. 17, 2014, 1:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/ 
2014/01/17/obamas-plan-leaves-unanswered-questions/. 
 55. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELE-
PHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PA-
TRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE COURT (2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/ 
default/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf.  
 56. Id. at 128–36. 
 57. Id. at 106–28. 
 58. Id. at 158. 
 59. Id. at 182–98. 
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not work as well as our founders intended. Sometimes they do 
not work at all. Accountability must be a priority despite the 
great challenges that our nation has and will have. The Fourth 
Amendment was drafted not for the “good times” or when 
things are status quo; it was drafted to protect our liberties in 
the worst of times. We must therefore be especially alert to 





 60. Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Remarks on Signing 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (Dec. 8, 1987), available at 
http://www.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks_on_Signing_the_INF% 
20treaty_120887.pdf.  
